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BOYCOTT OF THE LOS ANGELES 1984 OLYMPIC 
GAMES AS AN EXAMPLE OF POLITICAL  
PLAY-ACTING OF THE COLD WAR SUPERPOWERS
ABSTRACT
Sports boycott is one of the most important dimension of sport colliding with 
politics. The subject of the article is the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic 
Games in 1984, one of the most spectacular boycotts, which was conducted 
by communist countries.
It is widely recognized, that Los Angeles Olympics were boycotted as 
a result of a similar action by Western countries towards Moscow Olympics 
in 1980. However, evidence proves that there was no decision concerning com-
munist boycott of Los Angeles Olympics until a few months before the Games. 
Preparations to the Olympics were on their way, but unexpected change of 
Soviet leader resulted in the boycott.
Safety reasons were the declared reason for the boycott of the Soviet Union 
and 13 other communist countries. Nevertheless, it is evident that the real 
reasons were connected with the political game of USSR. The probable actual 
aims were the desire to hit the first ever privately financed Olympic Games 
and to make it harder for American president Ronald Raegan to be reelected. 
Naturally, at least partly it was also a matter of revenge for boycotting the 
Moscow Games.
Keywords: Sports politics, sports boycott, Cold War rivalry, Olympic Games, 
politics
* University of XXXX.
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Sports boycott is one of the most spectacular examples of sport and 
politics colliding. States or respectively their leaders may derive political 
benefits from sport – through winning competitions or many medals on 
international sports events or through particular victories in prestigious 
contests. Political benefits, especially in the area of image and prestige, 
may be also derived from organizing sports events, as they seem to be an 
efficient mean of worldwide promotion of a state, or in some cases - its 
political system. The political dimension of sports boycott is completely 
different. However, according to various factors, its political significance 
may even be greater.
A sports boycott should be understood as a resignation from participat-
ing in a particular sports event as a result of a protest. From the historical 
perspective there were various types of sports boycotts. Their scale differed 
from minor ones involving one state only, to massive ones, when big group 
of countries refused to participate in an event. However, there have also 
been individual boycotts, when single athletes or political figures resigned 
from participating in the sports competition, as happened during recent 
Olympic Summer Games in Beijing 2008 or Olympic Winter Games 
in Sochi 2014. In those situations various politicians in protest against 
the policy of a country that hosted the event decided not to be present 
during the opening ceremonies. There have also been various subjects 
against which the boycotts were directed. During the Cold War era some 
of them were tightly bound with the pure ideological rivalry between 
East and West. Others should be regarded as protests against particular 
events of the international politics, therefore they were directed against the 
responsible states or the sports organizations, due to their lack of reaction 
to the political occurrences. Boycotts conducted by African states were 
characteristic, as they were aimed to achieve particular political goals such 
as condemnation of white minority governments in Africa. Sports boycotts 
were then the reflection of changes in the international political system as 
they were usually the results of political crises.
The essence of sports boycott is the use of relatively simple method, 
thanks to which in a very far-reaching way one may draw attention of 
the world to a particular problem. At the same time, it is an easy way put 
pressure. According to some authors, “sports boycott is the only one that 
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is effective as sport is a cheap way to boycott” (Gemmell, 2004, p. 124). 
Sports boycott is often described as politically useful and not expensive 
mean of demonstrating dissatisfaction (Guelke, 1986, p. 143).
Boycotts of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 and Los Angeles Olympics in 
1984 are the best known to public. The latter example is the main subject of 
the article. The aim of the article is to investigate the decision of the com-
munist states concerning the boycott of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles 
in 1984 –held on the soil of their ideological rival – the USA. It is widely 
believed that it was a sort of a payback for the boycott of the Olympics 
organized by the Soviets four years earlier in Moscow. There is a doubt 
though, whether it was in fact purely a revenge by the Soviet leaders, or the 
decision was also influenced by other factors. The article is then aimed to 
point the actual reasons of the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games, 
apart from the declared ones. An attempt to answer, whether the boycott 
was prejudged form the moment Moscow Olympics were boycotted by 
the USA and some of its allies or the decision was made later, will also be 
ventured. The research will also include the issue of diplomatic activities, 
particularly of the International Olympic Committee and the organizers of 
the Olympics, that were aimed to prevent or reduce the size of the boycott. 
Also, an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the boycott of the Los 
Angeles 1984 Olympics will be made.
The research will be conducted with the use of cybernetic approach 
within the decision-making method. Accordingly, the communist decision 
to boycott the Olympics will be investigated considering such issues as 
the rational interest, emotions and personalities of the decision-makers 
(Pietraś, 1998, p. 29). Also, the research will encompass an attempt to deter-
mine the subject of the final decisions, which is not obvious in some cases.
ORIGINS OF THE LOS ANGELES 1984 BOYCOTT
In 1980 the biggest sports boycott ever took place. It concerned the 
Olympic Games organized for the first time in the Soviet Union – in its 
capital city Moscow. The boycott itself was deeply bound with the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. American president Jimmy Carter 
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first demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but when it did not hap-
pen, he led to the boycott of this sports event by the United States and 
a number of other countries. According to various authors between 45 and 
65 states decided to resign from participation in the Olympics as a result of 
the boycott declared by Jimmy Carter (Miller, 2008, p. 258; Lipoński, 1996, 
p. 62; Glad 2009, p. 211; Espy, 1981, p. 195; Guttman, 2002, p. 153 – 154; 
Moscow 1980). Obviously such situation was not desired by the Soviet 
Union. Nevertheless, this communist country did not settle for a preemp-
tive strike and participated in the organized by Americans Olympic Winter 
Games in Lake Placid earlier in 1980, although they were held when the 
threat of the boycott of Moscow Games was already credible.
The Summer Olympics in 1984 were to be held in the United States, in 
Los Angeles. Such location may have had suggested the possibility of a sort 
of a payback by the states belonging to the communist bloc of states. Such 
view is represented by many scientists investigating this issue and such is 
the common view. The issue is much more complex though and requires 
more detailed overview.
The election of Los Angeles as the host of the next Olympic Summer 
Games after those in Moscow could be regarded as a kind of compen-
sation for the election of the Soviet capital city. However, Los Angeles 
was the only city interested in hosting the Summer Olympics in 1984, as 
the other bid – Iranian Teheran – was withdrawn before the candidacies 
were considered (Jennings, 2012, p. 173; Garcia, 2012, p. 55; International 
Olympic Committee, 2011, p. 62). The bid of the California’s biggest city 
was unusual, as it was private. The city’s authorities did not agree to sub-
sidize the Olympics. In the face of a crisis of the Olympic Movement after 
a number of African states boycotted the Olympics in Montreal in 1976, 
the IOC agreed to such solution and in 1978 elected Los Angeles as the 
future host of the Olympic Summer Games (Miller, 2008, p. 255). The 
decision of the Committee was not a compensation to the West for the 
Olympics in Moscow then. However, Los Angeles’ bid would probably be 
one of the favourites for the election anyway, as it was applying to host the 
Olympics in 1976 (it was then evaluated as too inexperienced) and 4 years 
later, both times unsuccessfully (Hill, 1996, p. 139). Apart from that, at the 
time of the election (1978) there was still détente between East and West. 
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Therefore nothing suggested the future boycott of Moscow Olympics, so 
it was hard to envisage that the Los Angeles Games would also face such 
threat.
THE PATH TO THE BOYCOTT
The possibility of a boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics was under 
discussion in the Soviet Union from the moment, when Jimmy Carter 
for the first time declared his intention to boycott the event in Moscow 
(Guttmann, 2002, p. 157), which was in January 1980. Some of the Soviet 
leaders were reported to have said that Carter must have known, that the 
American action against the Olympics would probably cause the Soviet 
boycott of the next Games (Caraccioli, Caraccioli, 2008, p. 116). Similar 
information appeared in Soviet press (Whitney, 1980, p. 38). The assump-
tion that resignation from participating in the Olympic Games in Los 
Angeles by the communist states was considered as on option from the 
moment when the threat of boycott of Moscow by the capitalist states 
appeared seems credible then.
The Olympics in Los Angeles were then expected to become an arena 
of sports boycott. However, despite initial suggestions about the possibility 
of boycotting Los Angeles Olympics, the issue was not undertaken at all 
for more than three years. Moreover, during the IOC Session in New Delhi 
in 1983 Roman Kiselov from the Soviet National Olympic Committee 
assured that his country would come to Los Angeles (Lipoński, 1996, p. 66). 
Critics concerning American organizers of the Games only occurred in 
the Soviet press, where the issues of lack of the Olympic Village situated in 
a single location, low level of security, big distances between the venues and 
polluted air were raised. At the same time there have been many contacts 
between the organizers of the Olympics and sports officials from the USSR 
and other communist countries. First of such took place in 1979 when the 
president of the organizing committee Peter Ueberroth visited Moscow 
during a Spartakiad (Chruścicki, 1987, p. 6). Despite American boycott 
of the Moscow Olympics such visits were not terminated, for instance in 
February 1982 P. Ueberroth visited East Germany. During his stay a pro-
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tocol was signed, according to which East German athletes were supposed 
to compete in Los Angeles as long as the organizers would not violate 
the Olympic Charter. Although there were more such agreements, it was 
obvious that the final decisions depended on Kremlin (Hill, 1996, p. 172, 
179). It is worth noticing, that the organizers of the Los Angeles Olympic 
Games began a kind of diplomatic offensive aimed to avert the boycott in 
advance, although the issue officially was not raised at all.
In December 1983 an important meeting between the Soviet officials 
and the organizers occurred – 14 delegates from the USSR paid an 8-day 
visit in Los Angeles. The meeting resulted in singing a protocol of agree-
ment, according to which the Soviet National Olympic Committee pointed 
its expectations concerning the Soviet participation in the Olympics and 
expressed a desire to negotiate the issue of accommodation (Hill, 1996, p. 
172, 179). During the visit one of the Soviet delegates Marat Gramov was to 
have said that his attitude towards the Games was positive and that he saw 
no reason why the Soviet Union should not participate (Reich, 1984, p. 18).
In January 1984 another delegation from the USSR visited Los Ange-
les, this time in order to meet the IOC Executive Commission. The Soviet 
side requested Americans to accept Olympic identity cards instead of 
visas, agree that the Soviet airlines Aeroflot would jet the athletes to the 
Olympics and accept a USSR ship in the Los Angeles harbour (Hill, 1996, 
p. 172). So, the contacts between Soviet and American side were lively. 
It must be said that the USSR did not demand anything impossible to 
be fulfilled. Also, there were no mentions about the boycott. These facts 
imply that decisions concerning the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic 
Games were not necessarily made in 1980 or were delayed due to tactical 
reasons.
Another chapter of the events was held during the International Olym-
pic Committee Session in Sarajevo in February 1984, shortly before the 
Olympic Winter Games in the same city. The event proved to be important 
concerning the issue of possible Los Angeles boycott. Surprisingly to every-
one, Soviet IOC Member Konstantin Adrianov stated, that the organizing 
committee of the Los Angleles Olympics did a great job and despite the 
fact, that the Soviet Union was critical in the past, it could now congratulate 
the organizing committee. Some of the IOC members considered the state-
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ment as the declaration that the USSR would participate in the Olympics. 
However, a few days later the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov passed away 
and his place was taken by Konstanin Chernenko (Reich, 1984, p. 19). This 
occurrence can be perceived as a ground-breaking moment in respect to 
the Soviet attitude towards the possibility of participating in the Olympic 
Games in Los Angeles. In fact, the threat of the Soviet boycott as a payback 
for American one could be seen already during the Olympics in Sarajevo 
(Miller, 2008, p. 275). As a matter of fact, K. Chernenko represented the 
Kremlin hawks, what might have had a negative impact on the develop-
ments. Peter Ueberroth confirmed that the change of the Soviet leader 
was a critical point concerning the situation. According to him, from then 
on the communication between the organizing committee and the Soviet 
Union was gradually deteriorating (Reich, 1984, p. 19). The so far flourish-
ing dialogue was no longer sustained.
Until the beginning of 1984 the expectations concerning the possibility 
of the communist states competing in the Los Angeles Olympics were opti-
mistic. An important occurrence was held earlier though. On September 1, 
1983 a Soviet air fighter shot down South Korean airliner after it violated 
the Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. 249 passengers and 23 members of the 
crew died in the tragedy (Cheney, 2006, p. 32). The occurrence worsened 
the American-Soviet relations. For example, legislative authorities of 
California (where Los Angeles lies) issued a resolution condemning the 
Soviet Union. The resolution included a statement calling to ban the USSR 
from participating in the Summer Olympics in 1984. Although the state-
ment was cancelled shortly after its release, the Soviet Union responded 
by withdrawing its athletes from all sports events that were to be held in 
1983 in Los Angeles (Wilson, 2004, p. 211).
The shootdown of the Korean airliner had another, probably even more 
important repercussion – the creation of Ban the Soviet’s Coalition. It was 
a marginal organization whose aim was to prevent the Soviet Union from 
participating in the Olympics. Accordingly, it organized manifestations 
and collected signatures, although it only managed to collect 10.000. Still, 
it was to play a role in respect to the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic 
Games by the communist states (Hill, 1996. p. 171; Wilson, 1996, p. 173). 
Despite such developments the issue of the boycott still was not raised by 
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the Soviet sports officials, who until Andropov’s death implied that Soviet 
Union and other communist states would compete in the Games.
As mentioned, the situation was getting tensed since the Games in 
Sarajevo. In march 1984 Americans denied visa to Oleg Yermishkin, who 
was proposed by the USSR as the Olympic attaché. Americans however 
identified him as an operational officer of the KGB (Guttman, 2002, p. 159). 
At the beginning of April Soviet press amplified its criticism concerning 
the preparations of the Los Angeles Olympic Games. Its main concern 
was about the safety of the Soviet athletes. The culmination point of this 
campaign was at April 9, when the Soviet National Olympic Committee 
gave a statement, according to which a campaign directed against the 
Soviet participation in the Games arouse in the USA, characterised by 
threats of physical violence and persecution of the athletes representing 
the Soviet Union. Soviet officials also raised the issue of the procedure 
of entering the USA by the Soviet delegation. According to them, it vio-
lated the Olympic Charter. At the same time the Soviet side demanded 
organizing an additional meeting of the IOC Executive Commission in 
order to ascertain that USA would obey the principles of the Olympic 
Charter (Wilson, 2004, p. 211 – 212). This occurrence can be regarded as 
the beginning of the Soviet operations towards boycotting the Los Angeles 
Olympics, as for the first time they criticized the organizers of the event in 
such a strong manner, at the same time raising its political aspects.
The meeting requested by the Soviet Union was held at April 24, 1984 
at the IOC main office in Lausanne. The organizers of the Los Angeles 
Olympic Games were represented by Peter Ueberroth, while the Soviets 
by Marat Gramov, chair of the Soviet NOC and minister of sport. At the 
press conference Gramov reported, that some problems, which he did 
not mention, still need to be solved before the final decision concerning 
the Soviet participation in the Olympics would be made. He also said, 
that the Soviet NOC received many declarations and letters from various 
nationalistic and terrorist groups and organizations with threats (Reich, 
1984, p. 19). As can be seen from the statement, the meeting did not bring 
any meaningful solutions or declarations.
At April 29, 1984 M. Gramov sent a secret letter to the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party, in which he stated that the preparations 
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of the Los Angeles Olympic Team were in progress, but mentioned as well, 
that there was a risk that anti-Soviet organizations might use violence 
and encourage Soviet athletes to come to their side. The document also 
included a statement, that “the participation in the Games would be dif-
ficult if the hostile activities would not be ceased and that the absence 
of the USSR and developing countries would bring the first ‘commercial 
Olympics’ to economic catastrophe (…) if the [safety] conditions would 
not be fulfilled we will resign from participating” (Miller, 2008, p. 275). The 
document together with handwritten comments allow to partly recreate 
the decision-making process. The statement about the possible economic 
catastrophe of the commercial Olympic Games seems exceptionally 
important. Obviously such Games were aimed most of all to earn a profit 
rather that to promote a city or a country, as it usually happens. However, 
the document also mentioned the continuation of the preparations to the 
Olympics and the possibility of competing in the Games. Probably at the 
time the final decision still was not made.
At May 8, 1984 the Soviet NOC gave an announcement, according to 
which it would not compete in the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. As 
it stated, “the anti-Soviet hysteria arouse in the United States; extremist 
groups and organizations of different types trying to create impossible to 
accept conditions of Soviet athletes participation increased its activity; the 
American side shows it does not intend to grant security to the athletes 
and to respect their rights and human dignity; in such conditions the 
National Olympic Committee of the Soviet Union is forced to declare, that 
participation of the Soviet athletes in the Olympics is impossible”. There 
was no reference to the payback as a cause of such decision. As Gramov 
who presented the announcement stated, it was the decision of the NOC 
(Guttmann, 2002, p.157). It is doubtful though, as the final document 
was signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party – Konstanin Chernenko, while the initiators of such decision were 
supposedly head of the Soviet diplomacy Andrei Gromyko and chief 
of Soviet NOC Marta Gramov (Miller, 2008, p. 275 – 276). The decision 
itself most probably was made in the Politburo at May 3 (Senn, 1999, p. 
197). Therefore, the decision was made on Kremlin, not in the formally 
responsible National Olympic Committee.
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Shortly after the decision of the Soviet Union was announced, the 
organizers of the Olympics and the International Olympic Committee 
undertook various activities in order to ensure that as many countries 
as possible would participate. The situation was similar to the one four 
years earlier. Coincidently, at the same day of the Soviet announcement, 
American president Ronald Reagan handed president of the IOC Juan 
Antonio Samaranch a letter with assurance, that the USA would obey 
all the rules and principles of the Olympic Charter and that safety of the 
athletes and officials would be granted. Samaranch, a former diplomat 
and ambassador of Spain in Moscow, probably hoping for a change of 
decision, wanted to personally hand the letter to Chernenko. Therefore he 
requested for a meeting (Reich, 1984, p. 18). While waiting for a response 
he went to Prague with the delegation of the IOC in order to persuade 
other communist states to participate in the Games. He did not achieve 
much though (Miller, 2008, p. 276), but he received an invitation from the 
Soviet minster of foreign affairs A. Gromyko (Talk on Olympics…, 1984, 
p. 3). He headed to Moscow at May 30 for the last chance talks. Despite 
having diplomatic contacts, Samaranch did not manage to meet neither 
Chernenko nor Gromyko, but he met one of vice-prime ministers Nikolai 
Talyzin and Martat Gramov. At the time the deadline of declaring partici-
pation in the Los Angeles Olympics was approaching, but Samaranch was 
ready to postpone it. Nevertheless the talks failed anyway. As Samaranch 
reported, before he flew to Moscow the chances of the USSR competing 
in the Games were very, very small, but after them there was no chance 
at all (No hope for Soviets…, 1984, p. 8). The final settlement was easy to 
anticipate, but still an attempt was made to change the situation in the 
last moment.
At the same time organizers of the Los Angeles Olympics began their 
operations in order to persuade to come to the Games as many countries 
as possible. Their head Peter Ueberroth established a goal, according to 
which more countries should participate than during the Olympic Games 
in Munich in 1972, before the era of boycotts. To that end the organizing 
committee created a 24-hour open phone center responsible for persuad-
ing National Olympic Committees to participate in the Games. Also, agents 
were sent abroad and American embassies worldwide were engaged. Those 
103Boycott of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games
activities proved to be at least partly successful, as at May 12 Peoples’ 
Republic of China informed that it would compete in the Games (for 
the first time since 1952), while a few days later Romania declared the 
same (Wilson, 2004, p. 212). According to P. Ueberroth, “Africa was the 
most important area. We told them, that boycotting our Games would 
impact negatively on the attitude towards South Africa (…) we could have 
paid the Third World (…) Presence of Romania can be owed to 3 people: 
Samaranch, Siperco1 and Agnes Murza, our agent in Romania. She man-
aged to establish relations with their officials”. The agents mentioned were 
sent to every hesitant country and according to the strategy, they were to 
be strongly bound with the country they headed to – they were to know 
the language, culture and business (Miller, 2008, p. 275). It should be noted 
that one of the strategies was also used by the Soviet Union before the 
Moscow Games – less wealthy countries were receiving financial aid that 
would allow them to send teams to the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
The decision of Romania to send its team to the USA was in a way 
an unexpected exception if communist countries under Soviet influence 
are taken into consideration, as most of them decided to join the Soviet 
boycott. It was regarded as a great risk of Romanian leader
Nicolae Caucescu (Miller, 2008, p. 275). As a result, Romanian athletes 
were receiving a standing ovation during the Games. As should be men-
tioned, Romanian athletes performed exceptionally well in Los Angeles 
and were ranked 3rd in the unofficial medal table. The country also benefit-
ted from the financial aid program by the organizers and the IOC, which 
covered a third part of the cost of sending the team to the Olympics, 
estimated to be about 180.000 USD (Hill, 1996, p. 154). The other Euro-
pean communist country that was present at the Games was Yugoslavia, 
although it was obviously not within the Soviet sphere of influence (Mal-
lon, Hejimans, 2011, p. lxxv). All other communist European states acted 
according to the Soviet Union’s line. East German NOC decided not to 
participate at May 10, 2 days after the Soviet announcement (Wilson, 1988, 
p. 160). Poland and Hungary were considering sending teams under the 
Olympic flag, similarly to some of the states in Moscow (such as the Great 
1 Alexandru Siperco, IOC Member from Romania.
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Britain), but in the end they withdrew from the Games: Hungary at May 
14, Poland at May 17 as the last country from the communist block of 
states. According to Tadeusz Olszański, who was present at the meeting 
when the decision was made, he had no doubts it had been made outside 
of the NOC. The pressure from Moscow could be seen in the materials 
promoting the Friendship Games, a sports event planned to substitute 
the Olympics. As a result there was no voting and decision was made 
by Marian Renke, president of the Polish Olympic Committee, although 
according to Olszański he made the decision “suffering” (Olszański, 2000, 
p. 162 – 166). According to Janusz Peciak, Olympic champion who had 
suffered from the boycott as an athlete, M. Renke has told him a few days 
after Polish decision to withdraw from the Olympics that he agreed “it 
was horrible but he had no choice and that the boycott was an order from 
Moscow” (Wawrzynowski, 2015). It may be assumed then, that the decision 
was imposed by the Soviet leaders. Only a few reporters from Poland were 
sent to Los Angeles, but most of the transmissions from the Olympics were 
broadcasted on the radio, while television only showed short fragments 
(Tomaszewski, 1992, p. 235).
In 1982, 2 years before the Olympics in Los Angeles, Polish Olympic 
Committee has published a book dedicated to Polish Olympic prepara-
tions – Polski Sport Olimpijski. Polish Olympic Sport. Los Angeles 1984. It 
was about athletes’ trainings and the medal hopes. This may imply that 
the boycott was not planned in Poland since the Moscow Olympics either. 
This seems to back the thesis that the decision about the boycott was prob-
ably made much later and should not be regarded as a simple payback by 
communist states. It was most probably after the Andropov’s death when 
the boycott became an option.
Apart from the Soviet Union, the following countries decided to boycott 
the Olympic Games in Los Angeles: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Ethiopia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, 
Poland, South Yemen and Vietnam (Mallon, Hejimans, 2011, p. lxxv). 
The size of the boycott (14 countries) was not as massive as in Moscow, 
however it should be noted that those 14 countries won 58% of all gold 
medals during the Olympics in Montreal in 1976 (Los Angeles 1984). As 
many as 140 states participated in the Games, but the number is slightly 
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exaggerated due to the fact, that some of the territories were granted the 
possibility to compete in the Olympics even though they did not fulfil 
the requirements of the Olympic Charter (Toohey, Veal, 2007, p. 101; 
Guttmann, 2002, p. 160).
The decision by the Soviet Union and its allies about boycotting the 
Olympic Games in Los Angeles had a strong impact on the organizers. 
However, the situation was not seen as critical. The sponsors were act-
ing normally and the official broadcaster ABC, which seemed to be most 
exposed to the results of the boycott, underlined the possible benefits of 
more medal chances for Americans (Hill, 1996, p. 154). Generally speak-
ing Americans were rather optimistic concerning the Games despite the 
upcoming boycott by the communist states.
Judging by the numbers, the Soviet Union did not succeed fully in its 
mission of persuading many countries to back the boycott, similarly to 
the USA 4 years earlier when a number of American allies participated 
in the Moscow Games, often against the will of their governments. In this 
case Romania did not obey the dominating line, and what is more, most 
of the non-aligned countries joined the boycott. The number of states 
participating in the Games was also remarkable, although due to a sort of 
manipulation, as was said earlier.
The reasons for Soviet decision concerning the boycott of the Los 
Angeles Olympic Games are subject to many researches. The main declared 
reason was the insufficient safety of the athletes from communist countries. 
It was undoubtedly only a camouflage for the actual reasons. According to 
Alfred Senn, the decision probably emerged from the traditional Soviet 
superpower policy, a desire to lower the chance of re-electing Ronald Rea-
gan for president and to limit the revenues of the organizing committee 
(Senn, 1999, p. 198). The last aim seems to be the most credible, as it was 
also mentioned in the secret document mentioned above. However, there 
are also other opinions concerning the possible reasons for the boycott. 
Some authors speculated, that Soviet leaders might have feared a sports 
loss, but considering the results achieved by athletes from communist 
countries at the time, this hypothesis does not seem credible (Guttmann, 
2002, p. 159). Vast majority of the authors agree though, that it was gener-
ally a payback for boycotting the Moscow Games four years earlier. On 
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the other hand, continuing sports preparations to the Games may negate 
such view. A change of Soviet leader must be taken into consideration 
though. At the time of the Moscow Olympics boycotted by the West the 
Communist Party was headed by Leonid Brezhnev. After his death in 1982 
Yuri Andropov, who was regarded as more liberal, took over. In Febru-
ary 1984 he also passed away and conservative Konstatnin Chernenko 
was elected to head the country. Instantly a change in the Soviet attitude 
concerning the Olympics in Los Angeles could be observed. President of 
the IOC Juan Antonio Samaranch said once, that “if Andropov was alive, 
I think that we wouldn’t have a problem in 1984” (Miller, 2008, p. 275). 
Chernenko was a close associate of Brezhnev, so it might be assumed 
that one of the reasons for his decision was a desire to take revenge for 
boycotting Moscow. As Peter Ueberroth recalled, after the American 
boycott of Moscow Olympics was declared, one of the Soviet dignitaries 
have said: “Sometimes you call us a bear, a large bear. Now you can call us 
an elephant because we never forget” (Reich, 1984, p. 20). If it was true, 
these words might have suggested having made a decision concerning the 
future boycott at the time. The change of the Soviet leadership in the time 
between the Olympics might have led the Soviet Union to resign from its 
desire for payback, but in the end the conservative members of the Soviet 
leadership were in charge.
Despite the boycott, the Games earned a profit of over 200 mln USD, 
according to some analyses even more than 222 mln USD (Guttmann, 
2002, p. 163; Kumar, 2007, p. 315, Delaney, Madigan, 2009, p. 255). This 
way the Los Angeles Olympics set new standards in organizing such sports 
events in the future. Building the budget upon selling the television rights 
was one of the novelties. It constituted one third of all the incomes of the 
Games (Roche, 2004, p. 171). The city also benefitted from the Olympics, 
although it did not donate it. It is estimated that during the Games 5.000 
new jobs were created in the city, although they were temporary (Baade, 
Matheson, 2002, p. 144).
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CONCLUSION
In the article an attempt to analyse the decision-making process of the 
communist states, the Soviet Union in particular, concerning the boycott 
of the Olympics in Los Angeles was undertaken. It was also aimed to 
investigate the actions undertaken by the organizers and the International 
Olympic Committee in order to prevent it – particularly the diplomatic 
efforts aimed to persuade as many communist and Third World countries 
to participate in the Games as possible. The results of the analysis seem to 
confirm the popular belief, that the boycott of the Olympic Games in 1984 
by the communist states was in fact a payoff for the boycott of Moscow 
Games in 1980 by the capitalist states, even though the safety issue was 
declared as the official reason. Still, a statement that the boycott of the Los 
Angeles Olympics was a revenge for the boycott of Moscow Olympics is 
an oversimplification. According to many facts, the decisions concerning 
the boycott were made in the last moment, not in 1980. Moreover, both in 
the Soviet Union and in other communist countries the preparations to 
the Games were in progress for the whole 4-year period since the Moscow 
Olympics.
Many indicators point to the fact, that the decision concerning the boy-
cott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games was affected by the changes of the 
Soviet leadership. L. Brezhnev was heading the Communist Party during 
the Moscow Olympics, then he was replaced by more liberal Y. Andropov. 
The latter one died a few months before the Los Angeles Olympics and the 
power was taken over by more radical K. Chernenko. After that moment 
a vast change of the Soviet attitude towards the Games could be seen. It 
appears then that the boycott was not certain and it was mostly affected 
by coincidental deaths of the consecutive Soviet leaders.
The efficacy of the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games is doubt-
ful, similarly to most of the previous sports boycotts. Only the African 
states proved to be relatively successful in using a sports boycott threat and 
eventually boycotting various sports events such as the Olympic Games in 
Montreal in 1976 or the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in 1986, as 
they managed to isolate internationally the states they contested – South 
108 MICHAŁ MARCIN KOBIERECKI 
Africa and Rhodesia, which were governed by ethnic white minorities. 
In this case, Communist states failed to achieve their objectives, such as 
ruining the Games financially or limiting Reagan’s chance of re-election. 
In general though, sports boycotts do not bring political benefits and its 
main victims are the athletes from the boycotting countries.
Nowadays a classic sports boycott – a one that includes resignation 
of participating in a sports event due to political reasons by one or more 
states – seems rather improbable. Most of the boycotts turned out to be 
unsuccessful. Moreover, the economic significance of sport has risen in the 
last decades. Nevertheless, a sports boycott does not seem to be a dead tool 
of international politics, only its shape has changed. These days, if there 
are objections towards the country hosting a major sports event, boycotts 
still occur, only in a different way. Politicians, who normally participate 
in such events during for instance opening ceremonies, resign from this 
privilege. Such situations took place during recent Olympic Summer 
Games in Beijing in 2008 and Olympic Winter Games in Sochi in 2014. 
Such symbolic movement allows to express dissatisfaction concerning the 
policy of a particular nation without harming the athletes. Still, one cannot 
definitely exclude the possibility of a return of classical sports boycotts in 
the future. Such initiatives still do appear, for instance a discussion about 
the possibility of boycotting the Football World Championships in Russia 
in 2018 has arisen lately after a former Dutch footballer Johan van’t Schip 
proposed it (Zech, 2014). Still, as for now it is unlikely that another classical 
sports boycott may occur in the near future.
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